THE CHALLENGES OF RAISING REVENUES AND RESTRUCTURING SUBSIDIES IN MALAYSIA by Suresh Narayanan
Kajian Malaysia, Jld. XXV, No 2, Disember 2007 
1 
THE CHALLENGES OF RAISING REVENUES AND 
RESTRUCTURING SUBSIDIES IN MALAYSIA 
 
Suresh Narayanan 
School of Social Sciences 
Universiti Sains Malaysia 
Penang 
nsuresh@usm.my 
 
 
Malaysia has run deficit budgets in all but five years since 1970 but past 
deficits have been managed thanks to substantial oil revenues and high 
domestic savings.  However, the slow growth or decline of several 
traditional sources of revenue and the rising subsidy bill since 2007 
have given pause for reflection on the traditional approach to fiscal 
management.  In this paper, it is argued that fiscal management must 
not only centre around reducing non-productive expenditures and 
wasteful leakages but must also confront the problem of reducing and 
restructuring subsidies, particularly to petrol and petroleum-related 
products.  The global dip in petroleum process has fortuitously provided 
the respite needed for such an exercise and should not lull policy makers 
into complacency.  When the economy recovers from the current 
downswing, a solid revenue raising instrument such as the value-added 
tax must be introduced in order to wean the economy away from the 
current over reliance on petroleum-based taxes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Malaysia has experienced difficulties in balancing its budget. Since 
1970, the budget has been in deficit in all but five years and deficits have 
accumulated in periods of economic upturns and downturns, alike. 
Furthermore, since 1999, the deficits have consistently exceeded the 
figures forecast. This has prompted observers to comment that not only 
is the budget deficit structural in nature (not cyclical), but there is also 
an apparent lack of fiscal discipline (Ahmad Saifuddin, 2008). 
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Budget deficits in Malaysia became commonplace with the advent of the 
National Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970. In the ensuing decades, fiscal 
spending was actively used as a policy tool in support of NEP 
restructuring objectives. This spending spree came to a halt only in 
1986, when it was clear that the budget deficits had reached 
unsustainable levels. Concerted efforts to downsize public intervention 
yielded five years of small budget surpluses. But this period was short-
lived. Periodic downswings have forced the government to intervene 
with anti-cyclical fiscal policies, where expenditures often overshoot 
revenues. This was evident during the economic crisis of 1997−1999 and 
is becoming evident with the looming global crisis that threatens to 
derail the country’s export-led growth. On 4 November 2008, the 
Finance Minister revised the Growth Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
estimates for 2008 and 2009 downward, from 5.7% to 5% and from 
5.4% to 3.5%, respectively. The budget deficit forecasted for 2009 was 
revised upward, from 3.6% of the GDP to 4.8%. An initial stimulus 
package was also announced. It consists of RM7 billion financed from 
savings accumulated as a result of the reduction in fuel subsidies 
implemented earlier in the year.  
 
Despite the fact that expenditure growth has outpaced tax revenue 
growth, past deficits have been managed by resorting to substantial oil 
revenues and large domestic savings. These resources have enabled low-
cost borrowing. In fact, several traditional sources of tax revenue have 
either declined or are growing very slowly. A substantial portion of the 
revenue for 2009 will come from taxes on petroleum, petroleum 
products and dividends from Petronas. From this perspective, the high 
oil prices that prevailed during much of 2008 have been a great 
advantage. However, due to softening oil prices and the likelihood that 
developed countries experiencing recessions will demand less oil, oil 
prices may remain low in 2009. This, in turn, will adversely affect 
government receipts in 2010. If private sector activity remains 
lacklustre, the public sector would have to continue to enlarge its direct 
participation in boosting economic activity. Seeking new revenue 
sources would become an immediate and urgent imperative. Even if this 
scenario does not emerge, the public sector cannot continue with its 
dependency on revenue from petroleum, petroleum products and 
petroleum related activities. Not only is petroleum a depleting resource, 
it is a volatile source of revenue. Successful fiscal management, 
therefore, depends on how well Malaysia can reduce non-productive Raising Revenues and Restructuring Subsidies 
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expenditures and wasteful leakages and how efficiently it can tap into 
new and reliable sources of revenue. 
 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET  
 
During the 38-year period from 1970 to 2008, the federal government 
budget was in surplus for only 5 years: from 1992 to 1997. For the other 
33 years, the budget was in deficit, regardless of whether the economic 
cycle was good or bad. This suggests that the Malaysian deficit is of a 
structural nature. Beginning in the 1970s and up until 1986, the 
government played an active role in the economy, undertaking massive 
expenditures in support of the country’s new economic policy. This was 
particularly evident in the period spanning the Third Malaysia Plan, 
1976−1980. By the end of 1982, the federal budget deficit had peaked at 
16.6% of the GDP. The government downsized its role only in the 
aftermath of the major recession, which lasted from 1983−1986. This 
enabled the accumulation of surpluses in the early 1990s. Subsequently, 
the economic crisis triggered by the financial meltdown in 1997 induced 
the government to increase spending again, this time in a counter-
cyclical effort. In 2003, following a change in administration, the 
government recommitted itself to balancing the budget (Narayanan, 
1996; Narayanan, forthcoming). 
 
In attempts to reign in the budget deficit (which was equivalent to 5.3% 
of the GDP in 2003), several large projects were scaled down, postponed 
or cancelled between 2004 and 2006. By 2005, the budget deficit had 
been lowered to 3.6% of the GDP (see Table 1). In further attempts to 
reduce the deficit, fuel subsidies were cut and government-controlled 
fuel prices were allowed to rise. Between May 2004 and February 2008, 
fuel prices were raised five times (see Table 2). The fuel price hike in 
February 2006 alone reportedly allowed the government to save RM4.4 
billion. By 2007, the budget deficit was down to 3.2% of the GDP.  
However, the March 2006 launch of the Ninth Malaysia Plan envisaged 
that RM200 billion would be spent in public development expenditures 
between 2006 and 2010. This represented an 18% increase over the 
previous five-year period. The situation was exacerbated when crude oil 
prices hit record high levels in May 2008 and domestic petroleum prices 
were raised in order to reduce subsidy costs.   
 
 
        Table 1:  Revenues, Expenditures and Budget Deficits. 
 
 
Year Total 
Revenue 
Operating 
Expenditure 
Development 
Expenditure 
Total 
Expenditure 
Deficit GDP  Deficit/ 
GDP 
Revenue/ 
GDP 
2000  61.9 56.5  27.9 84.4  −22.5 343.2  −6.6 18.0 
2001  79.6 63.8  35.2 99.0  −19.4 352.6  −5.5 22.6 
2002 83.6  68.7  36.0  104.7  −21.1 362.0  −5.8 23.1 
2003 92.6  75.2  38.3  113.5  −20.9 395.2  −5.3 23.4 
2004 99.5  91.3  27.5  118.8  −19.3 474.0  −4.1 21.0 
2005 106.2  97.7  27.3  125.0  −18.8 522.4  −3.6 20.3 
2006  123.5 107.7  35.0 142.7  −19.2 573.7  −3.3 21.5 
2007  139.9 123.1  37.5 160.6  −20.7 641.9  −3.2 21.8 
2008  161.6 151.0  45.1 196.1  −34.5 715.9  −4.8 22.6 
2009   154.2  50.5 204.7  −204.7      
           
         Source: Ministry of Finance, various years 
           Note: Development expenditures refer to net expenditures Raising Revenues and Restructuring Subsidies 
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Table 2: Changes in Petrol Price (Per Litre). 
 
 
Date  Petrol  (RM)  Diesel (RM) 
1 May 2004  1.37  0.78 
10 October 2004  1.42  0.83 
1 March 2005  1.42  0.88 
1 May 2005  1.52  1.08 
31 July 2005  1.62  1.28 
28 February 2008  1.92  1.58 
5 June 2008  2.70  2.58 
23 August 2008  2.55  2.50 
24 September 2008  2.45  2.40 
15 October 2008  2.30  2.20 
1 November 2008  2.15  2.05 
18 November 2008  2.00  1.90 
 
 
Source: Loh (2008) 
Note: Petrol refers to RON97 
 
The budget deficit is anticipated to rise to 4.8% of the GDP in 2008, 
though it is projected to fall again by 2009, to 3.6%. The situation 
changed on 4 November 2008. The Finance Minister announced an 
additional stimulus package of RM7 billion in order to stave off the 
effects of the recession gripping the world. He revised the 2009 deficit 
upwards, to 4.8% of the GDP. The additional funds will come from 
savings in subsidies made possible by falling oil prices.
1  However, if oil 
prices remain soft in 2009, revenues will be adversely affected in 2010 
(see the subsequent discussion). 
                                                 
1  This is a curious claim. Since June 2008, when the petrol price was steeply 
increased, the government announced that the fuel subsidy would be fixed at 
30 sen per litre, regardless of the oil price. Consequently, falling oil prices 
will induce higher consumption and result in greater outlays on the fuel 
subsidy and will not induce ‘savings’, as the Minister claimed. In a 
subsequent statement, the Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs 
announced that the government had stopped paying fuel subsidies from 
November 2008 and it will save RM10 billion in subsidies next year if prices 
remained stable (Cheah, 2008: N10). 
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In terms of budget deficits, how does Malaysia fare relative to its 
ASEAN neighbours? As evident from Table 3, Malaysia’s deficit to 
GDP ratio was the highest among all the countries listed between 2000 
and 2003. In the later period, 2004−2006, Malaysia’s deficit was second 
only to Vietnam.   
Table 3: Budget Deficit as a Proportion of the GDP in ASEAN Countries. 
 
   2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 2006 2007 2008 
Brunei   10.9  0.4  −9.9  −1.7 13.5 25.2  12.8     
Indonesia  −1.1  −2.4  −1.5  −1.7  −1.0  −0.5  −1.0   
Malaysia  −6.6  −5.5  −5.8  −5.3  −4.1  −3.6  −3.3  −3.2  −4.8 
Philippines  −4.0  −4.0  −5.3  −4.6  −3.8  −2.7  −1.1   
Singapore  10.0 5.1 4.8 3.1  4.1  7.0       
Thailand  −2.2  −2.4  −1.4 0.4  0.1 −0.6  1.1   
Vietnam  −5.0  −4.0  −3.1  −4.8  −4.7  −4.6  −4.1   
 
Sources:  ASEAN data: Asian Development Bank, 2007.  
               Malaysian data: Ministry of Finance, various issues 
 
While annual budget deficits deserve attention, the impact of deficits 
accumulated over long periods become national debt. This conveys 
important information on the ability of an economy to sustain 
continuous deficits. The debt ratio, defined as the total federal 
government debt as a percentage of the GDP, determines the level at 
which the country can afford to borrow. The movement of the debt ratio 
over time provides an indication of whether the deficits are sustainable 
and adds to the overall burden on the economy (Riedl, 2008).
2 
  
Over the period from 2000 to 2008, federal debt averaged about 42.6% 
of the GDP (Table 4). The absolute size of the federal debt is growing, 
though the rate at which it grows has decreased. Between 2000 and 
2003, federal debt grew at 12.2% per year, far exceeding the GDP 
                                                 
2  We refer to federal government debt and not to total debt, which includes the 
debts held by the private sector. We also exclude debts of the non-financial 
public enterprises (NFPEs), government-linked companies that are not 
subject to government budgeting procedures or scrutiny. However, these 
entities borrow heavily and their accumulated debt often exceeds federal 
government debt. 
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growth of 4.8%. However, between 2004 and 2008, federal debt growth 
moderated to 7.1% per year and stayed well behind the GDP growth of 
10.9%. After peaking at around 46% in 2004, the federal debt ratio has 
been declining. Furthermore, since 2004, it appears that economic 
growth has been more able to absorb the growing amount of debt. Under 
current forecasts, the debt ratio is expected to decline to about 40% of 
the GDP by 2008. In comparison, the federal debt ratio for the US, 
arguably one of the most heavily indebted economies in the world, is 
projected to be 38% of the GDP in 2008. This is somewhat lower than 
the ratio projected for Malaysia. It is worth noting that the post-war 
years saw the debt-ratio averaging at about 43% for the US economy 
(Riedl, 2008). 
 
Table 4: Federal Debt, 2000−2008. 
 
 
Year 
Domestic 
(RM) 
External 
(RM) 
Total Federal 
Debt (RM) 
% External 
Debt 
Federal 
Debt/GDP 
(%) 
 
2000 106.8  18.8  125.6  15.0  36.6 
2001 121.4  24.3  145.7  16.7  41.3 
2002 128.7  36.3  165.0  22.0  45.6 
2003 142.3  35.0  177.3  19.7  44.9 
2004 182.0  34.7  216.7  16.0  45.7 
2005 198.7  30.0  228.7  13.1  43.8 
2006 217.2  25.0  242.2  10.3  42.2 
2007 247.1  19.6  266.7  7.3  41.6 
2008 266.8  18.3  285.1  6.4  39.8 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, various issues 
Note: All the debt are in RM billion. 
 
Another interesting feature is that the bulk of the federal debt has been 
financed domestically in later periods. This has been possible due to the 
high rate of domestic savings.
3  The flip side is that, to the extent that the 
government can gain access to these funds at favourable interest costs, 
the returns to domestic savers will be low. 
 
 
                                                 
3  Gross national savings for 2007 was estimated to be 38.1% of the GNP 
(BNM, 2007: 6). Suresh Narayanan   
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The Nature of the Deficit 
 
Current revenues, covered operating expenditures, and the budget deficit 
traditionally coincided with the size of development expenditures. This 
was breached only in 1986 and 1987, when revenues failed to cover 
operating expenditures (Narayanan, 2004). Between 2000 and 2007, 
total revenues managed to fund operating expenditures comfortably. 
This is projected to be the case for 2008 and 2009 as well (Table 1).  
 
However, the operating budget has expanded rapidly over the years. 
Between 2000 and 2003, the operating budget accounted for 66% of 
total expenditures, on average. In the second period (2004−2008), this 
rose to 77% of total spending. In fact, the growth rate between 2004 and 
2008 had overtaken the growth rate of revenue (Table 5). If this trend 
continues, Malaysia will reach a point where revenues will not be 
sufficient to cover operating expenditures. 
 
Table 5: Growth in Total Revenue and Expenditure Components,  2000–2008  
 
 2000−2003 2004−2008 
  Average 
share 
Growth  Average 
share 
Growth 
 (%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
Total  expenditure  -  10.4  -  13.3 
Operation  expenditure  65.8  10.0  76.9  13.4 
Development  expenditure  34.2  11.1  23.1  13.2 
Total  revenue  -  14.1  -  12.9 
 
Much of the recent expansion of the operating budget and the 
concomitant increase in budget deficits expected this year and the next 
has been attributed to rising subsidies and other social safety net 
measures (Zainal, 2008). The share of subsidies in operating 
expenditures and total expenditures has risen substantially since 2007; it 
is expected to account for slightly over one fifth of operating 
expenditures and about 17% of total expenditures in 2008 and 2009 
(Table 6). In fact, faced with rising oil prices in the middle of 2008, the 
Second Finance Minister indicated that spending on subsidies might rise, 
from the original figure of RM34 billion to at least RM40 billion. 
Subsidies have now become almost as large as emoluments, the single 
largest item in operating expenditures (Zainal, 2008). Raising Revenues and Restructuring Subsidies 
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As specified by the National Food Supply Guarantee Policy, subsidised 
items include fuel, cooking oil, flour, bread, and imported rice. Subsidies 
are transfers and do not add to the productive capacity of the economy 
directly. Furthermore, because they distort market signals and economic 
decisions, they should be used judiciously. They are presumably 
necessary to ease the burden on lower income groups. However, the 
biggest share of the subsidy bill goes towards subsidised fuels (petrol, 
diesel and LPG). Fuel subsidies began ballooning in 2004, when the 
market price for fuel rose substantially above the pump price determined
 
by the government.
4 By 2006, the fuel subsidy amounted to RM7.3 
billion, comprising 56.6 % of the subsidy allocation. By 2007, the fuel 
subsidy had increased to RM8.7 billion and accounted for 64% of the 
allocation. The fuel subsidy was projected to be RM18.3 billion (based 
on a crude oil price of US 105 per barrel) in 2008. This could amount to 
54% of the subsidy allocation (Bernama.com, 2009). However, an ease 
in the price of crude oil would change this figure. 
 
In an attempt to reel in the fuel subsidy bill, the government announced 
a 41% increase in petrol price in June 2008. The expected savings of 
RM13.7 billion will be rechanneled into the subsidisation of other 
essential items (Table 7).  The government subsequently committed 
itself to maintaining the petrol subsidy at 30 sen per litre, regardless of 
oil prices (Loh, 2008: 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4    Pump prices have been determined through the Automatic Pricing 
Mechanism (APM) since 1983. APM accounts for the global market price of 
petrol, marketing and transportation costs and a margin for dealers. When the 
market price is below the pump price (inclusive of all the other costs as 
worked out through the APM), the government collects a duty. When the 
market price exceeds the pump price, the government provides a subsidy to 
bridge the difference. Thus, subsidy payouts will increase with increases in 
the market price. Prior to 2004, the government collected duties, as the 
market price was lower than the pump price. Since then, it has been paying 
subsidies (Mikhail Raj, 2008). For six months, from September 2001 to 
February 2002, the government also collected taxes from the retail sales of 
petrol (Cheah, 2008: N10).  
 
Table 6: The Rising Subsidy Bill, 2000−2009. 
 
 2000  2003  Growth  2004  2007  2008  Growth  2009 
     2000−2003       2004−2008  
     (%)        (%)   
Subsidy (RM billion)  6.5  5.0  –8.4  8.5  13.6  34.1 41.5 33.8 
% of operating expenditure  11.5  6.7  -  9.3  11.0  22.6  -  21.9 
% of total expenditure  7.7  4.4  -  7.2  8.4  17.4  -  16.5 
Fuel subsidy (RM billion)  -  -  -  -  16.2*  18.3#  -  - 
 
Source:   Ministry of Finance, various issues 
Note:   For the 2000−2007 period, scholarships, educational aid and operating grants to schools have been added to subsidies to make the data comparable 
with the 2008 and 2009. 
* Cheah (2008: N10) 
# Subsidy payments till end of October 2008 was RM15.6 billion 
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Table 7: Rechanneling of Savings from the Reduction of Petrol Subsidies. 
 
 RM  billion  % 
Petrol subsidies  7.5  54.7 
National food supply guarantee policy  4.0  29.2 
Cooking oil subsidy  1.5  10.9 
Subsidy for imported rice  0.4  2.9 
Flour subsidy  0.2  1.5 
Bread subsidy  0.1  0.7 
Total 13.7  100.0 
 
Source: Loh (2008: 4). 
 
Several points are worth noting. First, subsidies are difficult to retract 
once they are granted. This was evident in the mass protests in the wake 
of the steep increase in petrol prices in June of 2008. Second, though 
they are often intended for the poor, subsidies do not always end up 
helping the poor. Between 70%−72% of the fuel subsidies are estimated 
to benefit the urban rich (Zainal, 2008). If correct, this represents a 
substantial loss to poor households. Third, due to the scope for 
substantial leakages, subsidies are a notoriously inefficient way to help 
target groups. A direct cash handout would be more efficient, reaching 
the target group with minimal leaks.
5  
 
Reducing fuel subsidies will not result in a smaller total subsidy bill, 
since the savings would simply be redistributed as subsidies for fuels 
and a wider range of products. However, since additional subsidies are 
granted to products consumed by the poor, this move will benefit poorer 
households. Nonetheless, up to 55% of the savings is used to maintain 
fuel subsidies that accrue disproportionately to rich, urban households.  
 
 
                                                 
5  As Dzof Azmi (2008) notes, “Subsidies…create strange economic situations. 
Approximately 100,000 fishermen get diesel subsidies amounting to around 
RM100 million a month. This is roughly equivalent to RM1000 per fisherman 
a month – probably more than they make catching and selling fish. If we were 
really worried about their welfare, we should just give them money directly, 
and have them do something else…”. Suresh Narayanan   
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In addition, some of the potential savings in subsidies (RM8 billion in 
2008) was whittled away by the granting of fuel rebates, which were 
effective beginning in April of 2008 and discriminate in favour of car 
owners, as opposed to motorcycle owners (see Zainal, 2008). Finally, 
fixing the petrol subsidy at 30 sen per litre will create the odd situation 
of a larger subsidy bill during periods of low petrol prices and a lower 
subsidy bill when petrol prices are high. A low price encourages 
consumption and consequently increases the subsidy bill. The reverse 
will hold true when prices are high. One can question whether subsidies 
are really needed in times of low prices.
6 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF REVENUES, 2000−2008 
 
Given that subsidies have been a rising component of expenditures in 
recent years, tax revenues are a declining component of overall 
revenues. Tax revenues have grown more slowly during 2004−2008 
relative to the 2000−2003 (Tables 8 and 9). Whereas total revenue grew 
at 14.4% per annum in the earlier period, the growth rate tapered to 
12.9% over the later period. Importantly, the dampening of overall 
revenue growth was a result of the slower growth in both tax and non-
tax revenues in the second period. In both periods, the growth of non-tax 
revenues was significantly higher than tax revenues. However, between 
2000 and 2003, non-tax revenue returned an annual growth rate that was 
twice the rate of tax revenue. In the second period, despite the fact that 
growth in both components had moderated, non-tax revenue growth 
continued to outpace tax revenue growth by 1.7 times. The growing 
importance of revenue from non-tax sources can be seen from the fact 
that its share in the total revenue averaged 24% during 2000–2003, but 
rose to 29% between 2004 and 2008. 
                                                 
6  A recent announcement suggests that mechanism such as a floor  price for 
petrol is in the cards (Cheah, 2008: N10). Raising Revenues and Restructuring Subsidies 
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Table 8:  Shares of Taxes in Total Revenue and Rates of Growth, 2000−2003 
and 2004–2008. 
 
 2000−2003 2004−2008 
  Average 
share 
Growth (%)  Average 
share 
Growth (%) 
Direct  tax  49.9 13.8 49.3  12.4 
Income  tax  47.1 14.5 46.9  12.5 
Company  tax  26.0 20.0 22.9 8.1 
Individual tax  10.9 4.6  8.6  12.9 
Petroleum income tax  10.1  12.3  14.4  20.8 
Co-ops 0.0  −11.7 1.1  1.9 
Other  2.8 6.0 2.5  9.2 
Indirect tax  26.0  6.8  21.3  6.6 
Export  tax  1.3 6.3 1.8  17.0 
Petroleum  export  1.2 3.2 1.7  17.9 
Other  0.0 7.7 0.0  10.7 
Import  tax  4.6 2.7 2.5  −11.4 
Excise  5.6 9.6 7.0  12.9 
Sales 9.7  10.1  5.7  2.8 
Service  2.5 5.6 2.3  9.1 
Other 2.4  −1.8 2.0 10.3 
Tax  Revenue  75.9 11.2 70.6  10.6 
Non  Tax  24.1 23.5 29.4  18.4 
Total -  14.4  -  12.9 
 
Source: Computed from data in Table 8. 
 
Turning to taxes on income, petroleum income tax recorded a 
significantly higher rate of growth in the second period (20.8% relative 
to 12.3%), followed by individual income tax (12.9% relative to 4.6%). 
In contrast, corporate income tax recorded a considerably lower growth 
rate (8.1% relative to 19.9%).  Suresh Narayanan   
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Table 9: Sources of Federal Revenue, 2000−2008 (RM billion) 
 
  2000 2001  2002 2003  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Direct tax  29.2  42.1  44.4  43  48.7 53.4 61.6 69.4 77.6 
Income tax  27  40.1  42.2  40.5  46.1 50.8 58.8 65.7 73.8 
Company 
tax   13.9  20.8  24.6  24  24.4 26.3 26.5 32.1 33.3 
Individual 
tax  7  9.4  9.9  8  9  8.7 10.2 11.7 14.6 
Petroleum 
income tax  6  9.9  7.6  8.5  11.5 14.6 20.7 20.5 24.5 
Co-ops 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Other 2.1  2  2.1  2.5  2.6 2.8 2.8 3.7 3.7 
Indirect tax  18  19.4  22.5  21.9  23.4 27.1  25 25.8 30.2 
Export tax  1  0.9  0.8  1.2  1.6 2.1 2.4 2.3  3 
Petroleum 
export  1 0.8  0.8 1.1  1.5  2 2.3 2.3 2.9 
Other 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Import tax  3.6  3.2  3.7  3.9  3.9 3.4 2.7 2.4 2.4 
Excise 3.8  4.1  4.8  5  6.4 9.3 8.6  9  10.4 
Sales 6  7.4  9.2  8  6.8 7.7 6.5 6.6 7.6 
Service  1.7 1.9  2.2  2  2.4 2.6 2.7  3 3.4 
Other 1.9  1.9  1.8  1.8  2.3  2 2.2 2.4 3.4 
Tax 
revenue 47.2  61.5  66.9  64.9  72.1 80.5 86.6 95.2  107.8 
Non-tax 
revenue  14.7 18.1 16.7 27.7 27.4 25.7 36.9 44.7 53.8 
Total 61.9  79.6  83.6  92.6  99.5 106.2 123.5 139.9 161.6 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, various years 
 
 
Petroleum income tax was introduced in 1967 and quickly emerged as 
an important source of tax revenue. Its share of total revenue averaged 
10% in the 2000−2003 period and rose to 14.4% over the 2004−2008 
period. However, petroleum income receipts are volatile. Not only do 
they vary with petroleum prices, but Petronas has sometimes protected 
its revenues by upping its output in the face of falling petroleum prices 
(BNM, 1985: 102).  
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Despite the higher rate of growth of receipts from personal income tax 
between 2004 and 2008, its share in total revenue actually fell from 
10.9% in the first period to 8.6% in the second period. This is not 
surprising, since its base has always been narrow and any broadening 
that has occurred has been eroded by increasing exemptions and by 
raising the taxable income thresholds. Unmarried taxpayers must earn 
more than RM2,950 per month before becoming liable for income tax, 
while a married individual has to earn in excess of RM3,200 per month 
to start paying income tax. Of the 10.5 million workers, only one 
million, or 9.5%, pay income tax. Most recently, in the 2009 budget, as a 
measure to lighten the burden of low income groups, the tax rebate was 
raised from RM350 to RM400 for those with a taxable income of 
RM35,000 and below. This move took an estimated 100,000 taxpayers 
out of the income tax base (Bernama, 2008c).  
 
It is important to remember that the poor do not pay income taxes. Thus, 
any benefit accorded via the income tax system will miss the group it 
was designed to serve.  
 
The personal income tax revenue accounted for only 2.8% of the Gross 
National Product (GNP) in 2001 and has declined to 2.1% of the GNP in 
2008. Revenue from personal income taxes has been sustained largely 
by better taxpayer compliance, which is estimated to be about 75% 
(Hamisah Hamid, 2007a), and collection efficiency, rather than through 
base broadening measures. 
 
The virtual halving of the growth rate of corporate taxes has resulted in a 
decline in the average share of total revenue, from 26% in the first 
period to 23% in the second. As a percentage of GNP, its share fell from 
6.4% in 2001 to 4.8% by 2008. Bearing the reductions in the corporate 
tax rates over the years in mind, this is not entirely surprising. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the growth rate has remained positive can be 
largely attributed to an expanding income base, a higher degree of tax 
compliance—about 65% (Hamisah Hamid, 2007a)—induced by lower 
rates and better tax collection mechanisms (through a wider use of 
withholding).
7 
                                                 
7  Under the 2007 budget proposals, the corporate tax rate for 2007 was lowered 
from 28% to 27%, and to 26% for 2008. A one percent reduction in the 
corporate tax rate results in a loss of RM500 million. However, Malaysia’s Suresh Narayanan   
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Under indirect taxes, the petroleum export tax, excise duties and service 
tax returned higher rates of growth in the second period relative to the 
first. In the case of petroleum export tax and excise duties, their higher 
rates of growth were accompanied by growing shares in total revenue, 
from 11.8% to 17.4% for the former and from 5.6% to 7% for the latter, 
between the two periods. However, in the case of the service tax, the 
average share was not only small to begin with but has declined in the 
second period, despite a higher rate of growth.  
 
The growth of revenue from import duties, on the other hand, turned 
from a positive 2.7% per annum in the first period to a negative 11.4% 
growth rate between 2004 and 2008. This is the only revenue source 
with a negative growth rate. The decline of this revenue source began in 
the 1960s, with the adoption of the import substitution strategy that 
prompted a steady decline in imports and, thus, declining revenue from 
import duties. The move to the ASEAN Free Trade Area, along with 
other measures of trade liberalization, has compromised the revenue 
contribution of import duties even further. The 2009 budget lowered 
import taxes on consumer durables, from between 10%−60% to between 
5%−30%. In any case, the bulk of revenue from import duties are raised 
from a very narrow base of commodities, including petroleum, alcohol, 
heavy fuels and oils, spirits and tobacco products. About 60% of imports 
are estimated to escape the tax (BNM, 1991: 206). To some extent, the 
demise of the role of import duties also gave new impetus to excise 
duties as a revenue generator. To compensate for the loss of import 
duties on cars from the ASEAN region, for example, the government 
raised excise duties on cars. 
 
Interestingly, the growth rate of the sales tax fell drastically, from 10.1% 
between 2000 and 2003 to just 2.8% between 2004 and 2008. Its average 
share of total revenue also declined, from 9.7% in the first period to 
5.6% period in the second. The sales tax was introduced in 1972 with the 
specific objective of generating additional revenue.  
 
                                                                                                             
tax rate is still above Hong Kong's 17.5%, Singapore's 20% and Taiwan's 
25%  (Hamisah Hamid, 2007b). 
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The sales tax has been plagued by weaknesses in its coverage. It is a 
single-stage levy confined to manufacturers and importers and applied 
largely to consumption goods. Its narrow base is reflected in the fact that 
it only captures about 40% of locally manufactured and imported goods 
(BNM, 1991: 206), thus failing to live up to expectations as a significant 
generator of revenue.  The revenue generated by sales tax compares 
unfavourably to that of ASEAN neighbours, who have introduced a 
broader tax on consumption. One example is the VAT (value-added tax). 
For example, Singapore’s VAT generated 8.4% of tax revenue, despite a 
low tax rate of 3%.  On the other hand, in the Philippines, a standard rate 
of 10% generated 22.1% of total tax revenues (Table 10).  In striking 
contrast, the Malaysian sales tax contributed a mere 6.9% of all tax 
revenue in 2007. 
 
Table 10: Contribution of VAT to Tax Revenue for Selected ASEAN Countries. 
 
Country*  Date introduced  Rate at introduction  % Tax  revenue  % GDP 
Indonesia 1985  10%  19.3  2.7 
Philippines 1988  10%  22.1  3.0 
Thailand 1992  10%  20.8  2.8 
Singapore 1994  3%  8.4  1.2 
Vietnam  1999  5%, 10%, 15%  24.5  4.0 
 
Source: Ebril, Keen, Bodin and Summers (2001: 9–12). 
Note:    *Based on data available as of Summer 1999. 
 
Apart from its narrow base, the sales tax suffers from tax ‘pyramiding’. 
Since the tax is imposed at the manufacturing level, as the taxed good 
passes through wholesalers and distributors each applies their percentage 
mark-ups to the purchase price, which already incorporates the sales tax. 
Thus, the tax pyramids as it reaches the final consumer, resulting in high 
consumer prices that do not generate commensurate revenues. Also, 
because it is applied at the first stage of production, it fails to tax the 
value added at subsequent stages of the distribution chain. Despite the 
‘ring system’ to exempt inputs from being taxed, imperfections in 
implementation have resulted in the persistence of tax cascading (or the 
multiple application of a given tax to the same commodity). 
 
More generally, the poor revenue performance of the indirect taxes 
offers a poor defence for their complex structure. Some levies (such as 
sales and service taxes) suffer from narrow bases, while others (such as Suresh Narayanan   
 
18 
import and sales taxes) share similar bases, resulting in many goods 
being subjected to more than one type of tax. 
 
Weaknesses of the Current Tax System 
 
The tax system suffers from two major weaknesses. First, as discussed 
above, the receipts from indirect taxes have been declining. This is 
attributed to the limited tax base of most taxes and to the sharing of tax 
bases. The second is the growing reliance on petroleum-based receipts to 
generate tax revenues. In fact, to a large extent, the rise in total tax 
revenues throughout this period can be attributed to receipts from both 
direct and indirect levies on petroleum and petroleum-based products. 
Apart from the petroleum income tax, there are duties on petroleum 
exports, royalties and dividends from petroleum, and taxes on petroleum 
products in the form of excise duties and import levies. Together, they 
accounted for an average of 32% of the total revenue between 2004 and 
2008 (Table 11).
8   
 
Table 11: Receipts from Petroleum Related Taxes, 2004−2008.  
 
  2004  2005 2006 2007 2008 
Petroleum income tax  11.5  14.6 20.7 20.5 24.5 
Petroleum export tax    1.5    2.0    2.3    2.3    2.9 
Dividends/petroleum royalties*    2.5    3.3    4.2    4.2    4.2 
Taxes on petroleum products**    3.7    4.5    4.2    4.4    5.0 
Total  (RM  billion)  19.2  24.4 31.4 31.4 36.6 
Share in tax revenue (%)  26.6  30.3  36.3  33.0  34.0 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, various issues. 
Note: * Dividends/royalties for 2008 is author’s estimate. 
          **Author’s estimate (47% of excise duties and 27% of import 
              duties. See BNM, 1990). 
 
It is important to remember that a heavy dependence on petroleum for 
revenue introduces an inherent instability to the receipts of the Federal 
government. This is due to the volatility of oil prices. It was estimated in 
1990 that a USD 100 increase in oil price would yield about USD 100 
                                                 
8  In a written reply to a question in parliament, the Prime Minister disclosed 
that Petronas has contributed RM62.8 billion or 44% of the government’s 
revenue for 2008. The forms of this contribution are unclear (Lee, Zulkifli 
and Loh, 2008) Raising Revenues and Restructuring Subsidies 
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million in additional revenue from petroleum income tax, export duties 
and royalties in the first year and an additional USD 400 million in the 
following year. A dollar decrease in the petrol price would have the 
reverse effect. The fall in petrol prices was a major cause of the first 
decline in Federal revenue in nearly 30 years in 1986−1987 (BNM, 
1991: 206).  
 
The recent rise and fall of oil prices has raised concerns about the 
sustainability of Malaysia’s forecasted revenue. For example, the 2009 
budget was drawn up based on revenues forecasted when oil prices were 
around USD 125 per barrel. High crude oil prices were sustained for 
about four month before they began to slide in September, 2008. On 
October 23, 2008 the price had fallen to as low as USD 67.40 per barrel 
in New York. If this persists, actual revenue will be lower than forecast 
in 2009. More significantly, if prices remained at an average of USD 70 
(RM245) per barrel in 2009, the revenue implications for 2010 would be 
serious. This underscores the urgency of looking for alternative sources 
of revenue, as was publicly acknowledged by the second Finance 
Minister (Yeow, 2008: B1).   
 
The Value Added Tax Alternative 
 
Malaysia has flirted with the idea of a value added tax (VAT) on several 
occasions, but has stopped short of implementation. A VAT was first 
mooted in 1988, the finance Minister then recognised the need for a 
stable and reliable source of revenue. However, he left office soon after, 
in 1991. The impending implementation of a comprehensive sales and 
services tax (SST)–essentially a repackaged VAT–was announced in 
1993. However, the continually buoyant economy yielded enough 
revenues to turn around the public sector budget from 1993 to 1997, 
obviating the immediate need to overhaul the tax system. This was 
unfortunate. The years of rapid growth were ideally suited to “integrate 
the existing sales, service and excise taxes and derive economies in a 
single tax administration” (BNM, 1991: 207). An integrated 
consumption-based tax would have removed the distortions inherent in 
the current sales, services and excise taxes, and simplified the tax 
machinery.  It would have helped to moderate growth and curb the 
inflationary pressures by reducing resources in private hands. More 
importantly, there would have been a solid foundation to generate fiscal 
surpluses in the years of prosperity. This could have been achieved Suresh Narayanan   
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without serious opposition, as incomes were rising (Narayanan, 1996: 
869–881). Unfortunately, this window of opportunity was missed. 
 
The idea of a VAT was resurrected when the Badawi administration 
came into power, inheriting a significant budget deficit. As Finance 
Minister, he announced in 2005 that a goods and services tax (GST) 
would come into force in 2007. In the intervening period, increases in 
petrol prices and several other commodities appear to have undermined 
the will to introduce the GST. The immediate impact would be a one-
time increase in the general price level, not a desired outcome in a 
period when prices were rising due to other factors. Thus, while 
Malaysia hesitated on the matter, virtually all of its ASEAN neighbours 
adopted the VAT.   
 
The potential tax base of a consumption type VAT based on the 
destination principle can be estimated through three approaches (Jenkins 
and Kuo, 2000). The simplest of the three, used here, relies on the GDP, 
the sum of the value added in the domestic production of all goods and 
services. Based on the destination principle, imports are taxed but 
exports are not. Thus, we add imports to the GDP and subtract exports. 
Because only consumption is taxed, gross private capital formation is 
subtracted from the tax base. The potential tax base is given by: 
 
Potential Tax Base = GDP + Imports  – Exports  – Gross Private Capital Formation 
 
The actual revenue that generated from this tax base will vary with the 
number and level of rates proposed, the exemptions allowed, the degree 
of compliance and the cost of the administration. The revenue 
implication of allowing exemptions and zero rating vary, depending on 
which stage of the production-distribution chain is allowed to be zero-
rated or exempted. To truly free a commodity from taxation, zero-rating 
must occur at the final stage. Similarly, if exemption is designed to give 
preferential status to a commodity, exemption must occur at the final 
stage. Zero-rating and exemption, granted at the final stage, will further 
erode the tax base and revenue collected (Narayanan, 1991). 
 
Allowing for the exemption of some sectors, the zero-rating of some 
products, tax avoidance at the retail end, lapses in compliance, and costs 
of administration, we assumed that only 40% of the potential tax base Raising Revenues and Restructuring Subsidies 
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becomes available.
9 We assumed that the VAT, if introduced, will 
replace the existing sales, service and import levies (except the 
petroleum export tax). The authorities may prefer to retain excises to 
impose a separate tax on luxury goods without complicating the VAT 
framework. 
 
The potential tax base of the VAT is computed for 2005, 2006 and 2007 
and shown in Table 12. Several points are worth highlighting. 
 
Table 12: Potential Tax Base of the VAT in Malaysia. 
 
Year 2005  2006  2007 
Potential tax base(RM billion)  349.5  385.0  437.3 
Available base (RM billion)(40% of potential)  139.8  154.0  174.9 
VAT rate required to raise revenue equivalent 
to sales, service and import taxes (%) 
9.8  7.7 6.9 
VAT revenue at 10% (RM billion)  14.0  15.4  17.5 
VAT revenue as % of  post-VAT total revenue  13.1  12.1  12.0 
Pre-VAT deficit/GDP (%)  3.6  3.3  3.2 
Post-VAT deficit/GDP (%)  3.5  2.7  2.4 
 
Source: Author’s estimates  
 
First, the VAT tax rate that would generate the revenues equivalent to 
what was raised by the sales, service and import taxes in the respective 
years is shown in row 4. On average, it is considerably lower that the 
rates associated with these taxes at present.  
 
Second, assuming a single tax rate of 10% (used by most countries in 
ASEAN, at least as a basic rate, excepting Singapore as shown in Table 
10), the revenue generated by VAT makes a noticeable contribution to 
total tax revenue that is far greater that the combined contribution of the 
existing sales, service and import taxes. These taxes, taken together, 
accounted for 12.9%, 9.6% and 8.6% of total revenue in 2005, 2006 and 
                                                 
9  Jenkins and Kuo (2000) estimated that, in a less monetized economy such as 
Nepal, the available tax base for VAT was about 20% of gross domestic 
expenditure. Given that the taxes the VAT is most likely to replace, if 
introduced, are sales, service and imports, our assumption of 40% of the 
potential base being available seems reasonable. The current import and sales 
tax only captures about 40% of their respective bases. Suresh Narayanan   
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2007, respectively. The comparable contribution of VAT to total 
revenue would have been 13% in 2005 and about 12% in 2006 and 
2007.
10  
 
Finally, VAT revenues contribute significantly to a reduction in the 
budget deficit. Needless to say, through better compliance and stricter 
monitoring, the tax base can be raised to 45% or more. In this case, the 
impact on revenue and the budget deficit would be even greater. 
 
While the VAT may be a more efficient source of revenue than the three 
taxes it might replace, it cannot be to sole tool relied upon to balance the 
budget. In would be wise to limit expenditures to prudent levels, to focus 
on increasing the productive capacity of the economy and to plug 
leakages. For example, in order to balance the budget in 2006 with a 
10% rate in place, the VAT would have to raise a total of RM30.7 
billion. This would require that almost 79.7% of the potential tax base be 
available. In order to balance the budget in 2007, the VAT must generate 
RM32.7 billion and capture 74% of the potential base. 
 
The introduction of a VAT usually raises expectations that taxes on 
personal income will be reduced. Otherwise, taxpayers will be hit from 
two sides: on the receipt of income and when they seek to spend it. 
Table 13 computes (in static terms) the percentage of the potential base 
that must be captured if the VAT was to make up for revenues lost by 
completely abolishing the personal income tax (an extreme assumption). 
We assume that the VAT is imposed at a single rate of 10%.
11  To make 
up for revenues lost by removing the income tax altogether in 2006, 
57.4% of the potential tax base must be available. This falls to 54.2% by 
2007. On the other hand, reducing income tax receipts in 2007 by 50% 
would require the tax base to be about 41% of the potential base 
available that year. Clearly, significant reductions in personal income 
taxes require a considerable widening of the tax base over time.
12  
                                                 
10 Post-VAT total revenue was computed by replacing revenue from the sales, 
service and import taxes with revenue from a VAT of 10% imposed on 40% 
of the potential tax base for each year. 
11 We assumed that the VAT replaced the sales, service and import taxes. 
12 The alternative is to raise the VAT rate. For example, complete removal of 
income tax would have been possible in 2007 with 40% of the potential tax 
base available if the rate is raised to 13.6%. However, this option must be Raising Revenues and Restructuring Subsidies 
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Table 13: Can a VAT Replace Receipts from Personal Income Tax? 
 
Possible reductions in personal income tax revenue  2005  2006  2007 
VAT (RM billion) revenue required if income  tax is 
abolished 
22.4 22.1  23.7 
% of potential tax base required  64.1  57.4  54.2 
VAT (RM billion) revenue required to compensate for the 
loss of half of income tax receipts 
18.1 17.1  17.9 
% of potential tax base required  51.8  44.4  40.9 
 
Source: Author’s estimates  
 
Despite the obvious attraction of the VAT alternative, we do not advise 
implementation in the current environment of rising consumer prices. 
While not inflationary, the implementation of the VAT is usually 
accompanied by a one-time increase in consumer prices. A VAT is best 
introduced during a period of rising incomes and prosperity, a window 
of opportunity that was lost in the early 1990s when the idea was first 
raised. 
 
Plugging Other Leakages 
 
While weakening tax revenue sources and a rising component of 
unproductive expenditures (subsidies are after all transfers and do not 
directly raise the productive capacity of the economy) contribute to 
fiscal imbalance and attract immediate attention, other leakages also 
weaken the revenue and expenditure equation of the federal government. 
For example, the Auditor General’s report for 2007 noted that there were 
57 federal ministries or departments, with arrears of revenue totalling 
RM14.08 billion. Of this, RM9.48 billion (67.3%) had been outstanding 
for more than three years (Ambrin Buang, 2008: 5). 
 
On the expenditure side, whereas 98.8% of the operating expenditure for 
2007 was used up, only 89% of the allocated development expenditure 
                                                                                                             
exercised with caution. Raising taxes on consumption (undertaken by 
everyone) to reduce personal income tax (paid by a small group of not-so- 
badly- off people in an economy like ours) will raise equity concerns. At best, 
the VAT is a proportionate tax and cannot really be made progressive without 
seriously compromising its base. Its lack of progressivity must be addressed 
from the expenditure side. 
 Suresh Narayanan   
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was spent (Ambrin Buang, 2008: 5). Thus, 11%, or some RM5 billion 
stayed out of the economy, despite being allocated for various economic 
activities. 
 
Corruption and financial mismanagement contribute to further leakages. 
On financial management, the Auditor’s Report noted that a few 
ministries and federal departments were not serious in addressing the 
financial management, despite the fact that the weaknesses had been 
repeatedly pointed out by the National Audit Department. More 
specifically, of the 28 ministries evaluated using Accountability Index of 
Financial Management, only one (3.6%) was rated as ‘excellent’, while 
five (18%) were rated as only ‘satisfactory’. Of the 31 federal 
departments, only five (16%) were rate ‘excellent’ while six (19%) were 
just ‘satisfactory’ (Ambrin Buang, 2008: 4–5). 
 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
Since 2004, the operating budget has been growing faster than revenue 
collections. If left unchecked, there may come a time when the latter will 
be insufficient to cover the former.  
 
Within the operating budget, the rate of growth of subsidy payments 
switched from a negative rate to a whopping 41.5% per year between 
2004 and 2008. In fact, subsidies are expected to account for about 23% 
of the operating budget by 2008. Much of this has gone to fuel subsidies 
that disproportionately benefit the urban, higher income groups.  
 
On the revenue side, non-tax revenues are growing faster than tax 
receipts. The rates of growth in receipts from the personal and petroleum 
income taxes, petroleum export tax, excises and the service tax have 
increased in the second period, while the rate of growth of receipts from 
corporate taxes has declined and revenues from sales tax saw negative 
growth. Clearly, tax revenue growth in the later period is driven by 
petroleum-based taxes. 
 
Thus, the challenge of fiscal management consists of finding more stable 
sources of revenue, redirecting expenditures on subsidies to more 
productive uses and eliminating wasteful expenditures in the public 
sector. While the VAT is a viable source of stable revenues, it cannot be Raising Revenues and Restructuring Subsidies 
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implemented quickly. The timing of the VAT is crucial if its initial 
impact on prices is to be mitigated. Implementation must wait for a 
period of stable economic growth.  
 
More immediately, subsidies must be phased out. This needs to be done 
gradually and in a consistent manner. The 41% hike in petrol prices was 
an unwise policy move; it provided the excuse for a general price 
increase, which has caused hardship to low income families. The general 
price level remains high despite the fact that petrol prices have almost 
returned to the previous levels. 
 
Finally, more serious and concerted efforts must be made to reduce 
waste in public spending. There is no evidence that anyone pays a price 
for negative mention in the Auditor General’s annual reports.  
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